In the framework of cooperative game theory, the concept of interaction index, which can be regarded as an extension of that of value, has been recently proposed to measure the interaction phenomena among players. Axiomatizations of two classes of interaction indices, namely probabilistic interaction indices and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices, generalizing probabilistic values and semivalues, respectively, are first proposed. The axioms we utilize are based on natural generalizations of axioms involved in the axiomatizations of values. In the second half of the paper, existing instances of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices encountered thus far in the literature are also axiomatized.
Introduction
The study of the notion of interaction among players is relatively recent in the framework of cooperative game theory. The first attempt is probably due to Owen [17, §5] for superadditive games. More recent developments are due to Murofushi and Soneda [15] , Roubens [19] , Grabisch [7] , and Marichal and Roubens [14] and led successively to the concepts of Shapley interaction index, Banzhaf interaction index, and chaining interaction index. First axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley interaction index and the Banzhaf interaction index have been recently proposed by Grabisch and Roubens [9] .
The concept of interaction index, which can be seen as an extension of the notion of value [2, 4, 11, 20, 21] , is fundamental for it enables to measure the interaction phenomena 1 modelled by a game on a set of players.
In this paper, we propose axiomatizations of two families of interaction indices introduced by Grabisch and Roubens [10] , namely the broad class of probabilistic interaction indices and the narrower subclass of cardinalprobabilistic interaction indices obtained by additionally imposing the symmetry axiom. Probabilistic interaction indices can be seen as extensions of probabilistic values studied by Weber [21] . Cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices are generalizations of semivalues, which were axiomatized by Dubey et al. [4] . We also separately characterize the Shapley, Banzhaf, and chaining interaction indices, which are instances of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices.
Besides classical axioms such as linearity and additivity, the axioms involved in the characterizations we present can be regarded as natural generalizations of those used in the axiomatizations of values. Two of the most important axioms in the proposed characterizations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices are the k-monotonicity axiom, generalizing the monotonicity axiom [21, §4] (called positivity in [12, §4] ), and the dummy partnership axiom, which extends the dummy player axiom through the concept of partnership (see e.g. [12] ). The notion of partnership is also at the root of some of the axioms additionally imposed to characterize the Shapley, Banzhaf, and chaining interaction indices. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall some basic definitions and results we will use in this paper. Section 3 is devoted to the concept of interaction index. An intuitive approach is adopted to present this notion and the axiomatizations by Grabisch and Roubens [9] are recalled. In the last section we present our characterization results. Probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices are first axiomatized. Then, the Shapley, Banzhaf, and chaining interaction indices are characterized by imposing additional axioms.
In order to avoid a heavy notation, we adopt that used in [9] . Thus, we will often omit braces for singletons, e.g., by writing v(i), U \ i instead of v({i}), U \{i}. Similarly, for pairs, we will write ij instead of {i, j}. Furthermore, cardinalities of subsets S, T, . . . , will be denoted by the corresponding lower case letters s, t, . . .
Preliminary definitions
We consider an infinite set U , the universe of players. As usual, a game on U is a set function v : 2 U → R such that v(∅) = 0, which assigns to each coalition S ⊆ U its worth v(S).
We now recall some concepts and results we will use throughout.
Carriers
A set N ⊆ U is said to be a carrier (or support) of a game v when, for all S ⊆ U , v(S) = v(N ∩ S). Thus, a game v with carrier N ⊆ U is completely defined by the knowledge of the coefficients {v(S)} S⊆N and the players outside N have no influence on the game since they do not contribute to any coalition.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to finite games, that is, games that possess finite carriers. We denote by G the set of finite games on U and by G N the set of games with finite carrier N ⊆ U .
Dividends of a game, Möbius and co-Möbius transforms
Let us recall two equivalent representations of a finite game (see e.g. [8] ). Any game v ∈ G N can be uniquely expressed in terms of its dividends
In combinatorics, the set function m(v, .) : 2 U → R is called the Möbius transform [18] of v and is given by
Another equivalent representation is the co-Möbius transform [8] of v which can be defined by
We have the following result :
k-monotonicity
Let k ≥ 2 be an integer. A game v ∈ G N is said to be k-monotone (see e.g.
It is easy to verify [3, §2] that k-monotonicity, with any k ≥ 2, implies l-monotonicity for all l ∈ {2, . . . , k}. By extension, 1-monotonicity (which does not correspond to k = 1 in Eq. (4)) is defined as standard monotonic-
we have the following result, which immediately follows from Eqs. (2)-(3) and [3, Proposition 4] :
Simples games
Let us now define two simple games of G N . The unanimity game for T ⊆ N , T = ∅, is defined as the game u T such that, for all S ⊆ N , u T (S) := 1 if and only if S ⊇ T and 0 otherwise. It is easy to check that T is a carrier of u T and that its Möbius transform is given, for all S ⊆ N , by m(u T , S) = 1 if and only if S = T and 0 otherwise.
Following Dubey et al. [4, §1] , for any T ⊆ N , we also consider the gamê u T ∈ G N , defined for all S ⊆ N , byû T (S) := 1 if and only if S T and 0 otherwise. It can be easily proved that its Möbius transform is given by
Permuted games
Following Shapley [20, §2] , given a game v ∈ G N and a permutation π on U (i.e., a one-to-one mapping from U onto itself), we denote by πv the game defined by
where π(S) := {π(i) | i ∈ S}. Note that π(N ) is a carrier of πv. 6 Katsushige Fujimoto et al.
Restricted and reduced games
Given a game v ∈ G N and a coalition A ⊆ N , the restriction of v to A [9] is a game of
This is equivalent to considering for v only coalitions containing players of A.
This is equivalent to considering for v only coalitions containing coalition B and some players of A. The subtraction of v(B) is introduced only to satisfy the constraint v A ∪B (∅) = 0. Given a game v ∈ G N and a coalition T ⊆ N , T = ∅, the reduced game with respect to T [9, 16] 
indicates a single hypothetical player, which is the representative (or macro player) of the players in T . It is defined by
Dummy coalition, null coalition, partnership, and dummy partnership
In other words, the marginal contribution of a dummy coalition S to any coalition T not containing elements of S is simply its worth v(S). A coalition S ⊆ U in a game v ∈ G N is said to be null if it is a dummy coalition in v such that v(S) = 0.
A dummy (resp. null ) player is a dummy (resp. null ) one-membered coalition.
A coalition P ⊆ U , P = ∅, is said to be a partnership [12, §4] 
In other words, as long as all the members of a partnership P are not all in coalition, the presence of some of them only leaves unchanged the worth of any coalition not containing elements of P . Thus, a partnership behaves like a single hypothetical player, that is, the game v and its reduced version v [P ] can be considered as equivalent. Now, a dummy partnership is simply a partnership P ⊆ U that is dummy. Thus, a dummy partnership can be regarded as a single hypothetical dummy player. It is easy to verify that any coalition T ⊆ U is a dummy partnership in the corresponding unanimity game u T .
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Probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic values
As mentioned in the introduction, interaction indices can be seen as extensions of values. In turn, a value can be seen as a function φ : G ×U → R that assigns to every player i ∈ U in a game v ∈ G his prospect φ(v, i) for playing the game. The exact form of a value will depend on the axioms that are imposed on it. For instance, the well-known Shapley value can be defined as the sole value that satisfies the linearity, symmetry, dummy player, and efficiency axioms [21, Theorem 15] .
Given a game v ∈ G N , the Shapley value of a player i ∈ N is given by
where
Another frequently encountered value is the Banzhaf value [2] (see also [5] ). The Banzhaf value of a player i ∈ N in a game v ∈ G N is defined by
Here also, if i ∈ N , we set φ B (v, i) := 0. The Shapley and Banzhaf values are instances of probabilistic values [21] and, more precisely, of cardinal-probabilistic values also known as semivalues [4] .
A probabilistic value φ p of a player i ∈ N in a game v ∈ G N is a value of the form
where the family of coefficients {p i T (N )} T ⊆N \i forms a probability distribution on 2 N \i . Again, if i ∈ N , we naturally set φ p (v, i) := 0.
Thus defined, φ p (v, i) can be interpreted as the mathematical expectation on 2 N \i of the marginal contribution
A cardinal-probabilistic value is a probabilistic value such that, additionally, for all i ∈ N , the coefficients p i T (N ) (T ⊆ N \ i) depend only on the cardinal of the coalitions i, T , and N , i.e., there exist n nonnegative real numbers {p t (n)} t=0,...,n−1 fulfilling
such that, for any i ∈ N and any T ⊆ N \ i, we have p i T (N ) = p t (n). 
Intuitive presentation of interaction indices
As noticed by Grabisch and Roubens [9] , the fact that in general, for a player
is not equal to the coefficient v(i) shows that players in N have some interest in forming coalitions. For instance, consider another player j ∈ N and assume that v(i) and v(j) are small whereas v(ij) is large. Then, i and j have clearly a strong interest in joining together. Conversely, it may happen that v(i) and v(j) are large whereas v(ij) is small, in which case i and j have no interest in joining together. In order to intuitively approach the concept of interaction, consider two players i and j such that
Clearly, the above inequality seems to model a positive interaction or complementary effect between i and j. Similarly, the inequality
suggests considering that i and j interact in a negative or redundant way.
it seems natural to consider that players i and j do not interact, i.e., that they have independent roles in the game. A coefficient measuring the interaction between i and j should therefore depend on the difference
However, as discussed by Grabisch and Roubens [9] , the intuitive concept of interaction requires a more elaborate definition. Clearly, one should not only compare v(ij) and v(i) + v(j) but also see what happens when i, j, and ij join coalitions. In other words, an index of interaction between i and j in the game v ∈ G N should take into account all the coefficients of the
Owen [17, §5] defined an interaction index between two players ij ⊆ N in a game v ∈ G N by
Notice that, for a coalition T not containing i and j, the expression
can be regarded as the difference between the marginal contributions
Following Grabisch et al. [8, §2] , we shall call this expression the marginal interaction between i and j in the presence of T . Indeed, it seems natural to consider that if
then i and j interact positively (resp. negatively) in the presence of T since the presence of player i increases (resp. decreases) the marginal contribution of j to coalition T . The interaction index proposed by Owen, which was actually rediscovered twenty years later by Murofushi and Soneda [15] , can thus be regarded as a weighted average of the marginal interactions between i and j in the presence of T , all coalitions T not containing i and j being considered.
Grabisch [7] recently extended the above interaction index to coalitions containing more than two players. The Shapley interaction index [7] of a coalition S ⊆ N in a game v ∈ G N is defined by
This index is an extension of the Shapley value in the sense that
Two similar indices are due to Roubens [19] and Marichal and Roubens [14] and are known as the Banzhaf interaction index and the chaining interaction index 2 , respectively. The former extends the Banzhaf value, while the latter (also) extends the Shapley value.
The Banzhaf interaction index [19] and the chaining interaction index [14] of a coalition S ⊆ N in a game v ∈ G N are respectively defined by
If S ⊆ N , we naturally set I Sh (v, S) := 0, I B (v, S) := 0, and I ch (v, S) := 0. It was shown [8, 14] that, for any v ∈ G N , the restriction of I Sh (v, .) (resp.
Probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices
By analogy with the work of Dubey et al. [4] and Weber [21] on values, Grabisch and Roubens [10] defined the class of probabilistic interaction indices and the subclass of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices.
where, for any S ⊆ N , the family of coefficients {p S T (N )} T ⊆N \S forms a probability distribution on 2 N \S . Here again, if S ⊆ N , we naturally set
A cardinal-probabilistic interaction index is a probabilistic interaction index such that, additionally, for any S ⊆ N , the coefficients p S T (N ) (T ⊆ N \ S) depend only on the cardinal of the coalitions S, T , and N , i.e., for any s ∈ {0, . . . , n}, there exists a family of nonnegative real numbers
such that, for any S ⊆ N and any T ⊆ N \ S, we have p S T (N ) = p s t (n). [8, §2] . These indices will be called internal and external interaction indices, respectively. This terminology will be justified in Subsection 4.4.
Interpretation of probabilistic interaction indices
Similarly to probabilistic values, a probabilistic interaction index of a coalition S ⊆ N , s ≥ 1, in a game v ∈ G N can be regarded as the mathematical expectation on 2 N \S of ∆ S v(T ) with respect to the probability distribution {p S T (N )} T ⊆N \S . The interpretation of I p (v, S) when s = 1 has already been discussed in Subsection 3.1. In this subsection we provide an interpretation of I p (v, S) when s ≥ 2 based on a interpretation of ∆ S v(T ) (T ⊆ N \ S) as the marginal interaction among players in S in the presence of T [8] .
As discussed in [13] , let us show that, for any coalition S ⊆ N , s ≥ 2, the quantity ∆ S v(T ) can be interpreted in the same way as ∆ ij v(T ).
We have seen that, for two players i and j and a coalition T ⊆ N \ ij, ∆ ij v(T ) corresponds to the difference between the marginal contributions ∆ i v(T ∪ j) and ∆ i v(T ) or equivalently, by symmetry, to the difference between ∆ j v(T ∪ i) and ∆ j v(T ), i.e.,
It seems then sensible to define the marginal non-interaction (in this case marginal independence) between i and j in the presence of T as the equality of the marginal contributions in the equations above. Similarly, marginal positive (resp. negative) interaction between i and j in the presence of T occurs when, for example,
For three players ijk ⊆ N and a coalition T ⊆ N \ ijk, it is easy to verify that ∆ ijk v(T ) can be rewritten as
, in others words, that the presence of player i does not affect the marginal interaction between players j and k. From the equations above, this is equivalent to
Thus, we see that if the presence of one of the three players does not affect the marginal interaction between the two others, then, by symmetry, the marginal interaction between any pair of players is not affected by the presence of the remaining player. In this case, it seems natural to consider that the three players do not interact simultaneously in the presence of T . Similarly, when, for example,
, we shall consider that ijk interact positively (resp. negatively) in the presence of T . In the general case, it is easy to verify from the definition of the discrete derivative that, for any S ⊆ N , s ≥ 1, any i ∈ N \S, and any T ⊆ N \(S ∪i),
Using the previous result and pursuing the same reasoning as above, for any S ⊆ N , s ≥ 2, any T ⊆ N \ S, when ∆ S v(T ) > 0 (resp. < 0), it seems sensible to consider that there exists a positive (resp. negative) simultaneous interaction among the players in S in the presence of T . However, ∆ S v(T ) = 0 should obviously not be interpreted as an absence of interactions among players in S in the presence of T but as an absence of simultaneous interaction among the players in S in the presence of T .
Coming back to the interaction indices, we thus have the following interpretation : for a coalition S ⊆ N , s ≥ 2, the inequality I p (v, S) > 0 (resp. < 0) can be interpreted as a positive (resp. negative) simultaneous interaction among all the players in S on average. However, I p (v, S) = 0 should not be interpreted as an absence of interaction among players in S on average but as an absence of simultaneous interaction among all the players in S on average. Remark 2 From the above interpretation and Proposition 2, it is important to notice that for a k-monotone game v (k ≥ 2), the marginal interaction among players of a coalition S, 2 ≤ s ≤ k, is necessarily positive, and thus that I p (v, S) ≥ 0. This observation is at the root of the k-monotonicity axiom that we shall state in the next section.
Existing axiomatic characterizations
Setting U := 2 U \ {∅}, an interaction index can be regarded as a function I : G × U → R such that, for any v ∈ G and any i ∈ U , I(v, i) is the value of player i in the game v, and for any S ⊆ U such that s ≥ 2, I(v, S) is a measure of the (simultaneous) interaction among players in S in the game v.
Grabisch and Roubens recently proposed an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley and the Banzhaf interaction indices [9, §3] . We present their results hereafter, with the only difference that here we force the second argument of I to be nonempty.
The following axioms have been considered by Grabisch and Roubens :
-Linearity axiom (L) : I is a linear function with respect to its first argument. 
Axiom (L) implies that values and interaction indices are linear combinations of the basic information related to the game : the worth of each coalition of players. Axiom (D) states that a dummy player has a value equal to its worth and that he does not interact with any outsider coalition (see [9] ). Axiom (S) indicates that the names of the players play no role in determining the values and interaction indices. Axiom (R) postulates that interaction at level s is linked to the difference of interactions defined at level (s − 1) (more details can be found in [9, §3] ). Axiom (E), initially considered by Shapley [20] , is dedicated to values and ensures the players in a game v ∈ G N share the total amount v(N ) among them in terms of their respective values. Axiom (2-E), initially considered by Nowak [16] , expresses the fact that the sum of the values of two players should be equal to the value of these players considered as twins in the corresponding reduced game.
The following theorem was shown by Grabisch and Roubens in [9, §3] :
Theorem 1 Let I be a function from G × U to R. 
Characterizations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices
We shall now axiomatize the class of probabilistic interaction indices and that of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices. The following axioms are first considered : Axiom (A) indicates that interaction indices should be decomposable additively whenever games are decomposable additively. Axiom (M), used by Weber in [21, §4] to characterize probabilistic values, concerns only the value part of I and states that, since in a monotone game the marginal contributions of a player are necessarily positive, its value should be positive. Axiom (M k ) can be seen as a generalization of axiom (M) and concerns the interaction part of I. As discussed in Subsection 3.4, in a k-monotone game (k ≥ 2), it seems sensible to consider that there are necessarily complementarity effects among players of coalitions containing between 2 and k players. Axiom (M k ) then simply states that these effects should be represented as positive interactions.
We now present the following important lemma : are clearly nonnegative. On the other hand, by (A), the first one converges to l := λI(u T , S) − I(λu T , S) and the second one converges to −l. It follows that l = 0, which completes the proof.
We also consider the following fundamental axiom :
-Dummy partnership axiom (DP) : For any v ∈ G, if P = ∅ is a dummy partnership in v, then (i) I(v, P ) = v(P ), (ii) for all S ⊆ U \ P , S = ∅, we have I(v, S ∪ P ) = 0.
Axiom (DP) is a natural generalization of axiom (D). As discussed by Weber [21, §3] , the first part of axiom (D) is based on the following intuition : since the marginal contribution of a dummy player to any coalition not containing it is simply its worth, its value should be its worth as well. Similarly, the first part of axiom (DP) states that the interaction index of a dummy partnership P in a game v should be its worth since the marginal interaction among the players in P in the presence of any coalition T not containing elements of P is its worth, that is,
The second part of axiom (DP) is a natural extension of the second part of axiom (D) and says that there should be no simultaneous interaction among players of coalitions containing dummy partnerships.
We now provide axiomatic characterizations of probabilistic and cardinalprobabilistic interaction indices. The proofs are given in Appendix A. 
where the integral is to be understood in the sense of Riemann-Stieltjes.
Thus, with each cardinal-probabilistic interaction index I p is associated a unique denumerable family of CDFs F := {F s | s ≥ 1} and we will write
Remark 3 It is easy to see that the CDFs corresponding to the Shapley, Banzhaf, and chaining interaction indices as well as for the Möbius and co-Möbius transforms are given in the following table, where, for any E ⊆ [0, 1], 1 E denotes the characteristic function of E :
The following result will be useful as we go on. For the proof, see first remark following Proposition 2.1 in [8] .
Proposition 3 For any N ⊆ U finite, n ≥ 1, any cardinal-probabilistic interaction index can be rewritten in terms of the Möbius transform as
where, for all s ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and all t ∈ {s, . . . , n},
From Theorem 4 and Proposition 3, it follows immediately that
which shows that the coefficients q s t (n) of Proposition 3 do not depend on n. More precisely, we have
Remark 4 It is noteworthy that, since q s s = p s 0 (s) = 1 for all s ≥ 1, the coefficient matrix of the linear system (15) is invertible and hence, that the restriction of I p (v, .) to 2 N \ {∅} is an equivalent representation of the restriction of v to 2 N \ {∅}.
We now show that Eq. (16) lead to generalizations of formulas presented in [8] and [14] . Let N ⊆ U finite, n ≥ 1, and v ∈ G N . Considering the Owen multilinear extension [17] 
and then combining Eq. (16) and [8, Eq. (22) ], we have the following formula, which generalizes [8, Eqs. (23)-(26)] :
where ∆ S g is the classical S-derivative of g, that is,
Therefore, in addition to Eq. (16), for any v ∈ G and any S ⊆ U , s ≥ 1, we have the following formulas (cf. Eqs. (32) and (40) in [8] )
where, for any integer k ≥ 0, B k (x) represents the kth Bernoulli polynomial.
We shall now proceed with the characterizations of the Shapley, Banzhaf, and chaining interaction indices as well as with the axiomatizations of the Möbius and co-Möbius transforms, which, as mentioned before, are all instances of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices.
Characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf interaction indices by means of the reduced-partnership-consistency axiom
The following axiom is first additionally considered : Recall that a partnership can be considered as behaving as a single hypothetical player. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that the marginal interaction among the players of a partnership P in a game v ∈ G N in the presence of a coalition T ⊆ N \ P is equal to the marginal contribution of P to coalition T , i.e., ∆ P v(T ) = v(T ∪ P ) − v(T ). In other words, when we measure the interaction among the players of a partnership, it is as if we were measuring the value of an hypothetical player. Axiom (RPC) then simply states that the interaction among players of a partnership P in a game v should be regarded as the value of the reduced partnership [P ] in the corresponding reduced game v [P ] .
We then have the following interesting result :
Proposition 4 A function I : G × U → R that satisfies axioms (L), (D) and (RPC) also satisfies axiom (DP).
Proof Let v ∈ G and let P = ∅ be a dummy partnership in v. By (RPC) and (D), we immediately have
Let us now show that the second part of axiom (DP) is also true. Let S ⊆ U \ P , S = ∅, and let N be a carrier of v. By Theorem 1(ii), we have I(v, S ∪ P ) = 0 if S ∪ P ⊆ N and
otherwise. However, since P is a dummy partnership, we have, for any T ⊆ N \ (S ∪ P ),
and hence I(v, S ∪ P ) = 0.
We now state axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf interaction indices. The proofs of the theorems are given in Appendix C.
Theorem 5 The Shapley interaction index is the only cardinal-probabilistic interaction index additionally satisfying axioms (E) and (RPC). As a consequence, the Shapley interaction index is the only interaction index satisfying axioms (A), (M), (M k ), (D or DP), (S), (E), and (RPC).

Theorem 6 The Banzhaf interaction index is the only cardinal-probabilistic interaction index additionally satisfying axioms (2-E) and (RPC). As a consequence, the Banzhaf interaction index is the only interaction index satisfying axioms (A), (M), (M k ), (D or DP), (S), (2-E), and (RPC).
The following interesting result can be used to obtain additional characterizations of the two interaction indices under consideration. It is a direct consequence of Lemma 4 (see Appendix C) and [9, Proposition 8] .
Proposition 5 Under axioms (L), (DP), and (S), axioms (R) and (RPC) are equivalent.
Characterizations of the Banzhaf and chaining interaction indices by means of the partnership-allocation axiom
We consider the following additional axiom :
Let I p be a cardinal-probabilistic interaction index, P be a partnership in a game v ∈ G N , and i be a member of P . Then axiom (PA) is based on the following intuitions : 1. It is easy to verify that I p (v, P ) is a weighted average of the marginal contributions v(T ∪P )−v(T ) (T ⊆ N \P ) and that I p (v, i) is a weighted sum of these same marginal contributions. In other words, both I p (v, P ) and I p (v, i) can be considered as measuring the value in the game v of the hypothetical macro player corresponding to P . 2. Let α be the real number such that I p (v, P ) = αI p (v, i). Notice this equality still holds if i is replaced with any other player j ∈ P , since all players in a partnership play symmetric roles. The coefficient α, which depends only on P and v, can then be seen as determining the way I p (v, P ) is calculated from the value of any of the players of the partnership, quantity that contains all the "relevant information" as discussed in Point 1. 3. It could then be required that the way the value of P is determined from the value of a player of the partnership does not depend on the underlying game but only on P . Coalition P being clearly a (dummy) partnership in the unanimity game u P , we immediately obtain that αI p (u P , i) = 1, which justifies axiom (PA). We now state another characterization of the Banzhaf interaction index and a characterization of the chaining interaction index. The proofs of the theorems are given in Appendix D.
Theorem 7 The Banzhaf interaction index is the only cardinal-probabilistic interaction index additionally satisfying axioms (2-E) and (PA). As a consequence, the chaining interaction index is the only interaction index satisfying axioms (A), (M), (M k ), (DP), (S), (2-E), and (PA).
Theorem 8 The chaining interaction index is the only cardinal-probabilistic interaction index additionally satisfying axioms (E) and (PA). As a consequence, the chaining interaction index is the only interaction index satisfying axioms (A), (M), (M k ), (DP), (S), (E), and (PA).
Characterizations of the internal and external interaction indices
Finally, we consider two last axioms in order to characterize the internal and external interaction indices (i.e., the Möbius and the co-Möbius transforms) : (N \ S) ) is exactly the marginal interaction among players in S in the presence of no (resp. all) outside players. Thus, axiom (II) simply states that the interaction index among players of a nonempty coalition S in a game v should be independent of players that are outside S. At the opposite, axiom (EI) states the interaction index among players of a nonempty coalition S in a game v should be measured in the presence of all outside players. 4 We can then state the two following characterizations : The result is then immediately obtained by using the game u N in the equation above. 
Conclusion
Axiomatic characterizations of the broad class of probabilistic interaction indices and of the narrower subclass of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices have been proposed. The presented characterizations are based on natural generalizations of the monotonicity and dummy player axioms, namely, the k-monotonicity and the dummy partnership axioms. Then, by further imposing classical axioms such as efficiency, 2-efficiency, and additional axioms based on the concept of partnership, we have characterized the Shapley, Banzhaf, and chaining interactions indices, which are the three best-known instances of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices.
